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THE APPLICATION AND DECLARATIONS IN THE
STANDARD AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY
BY P. MAGARICK*
The process leading up to the issuance of an insurance policy begins
with an application, submitted by the prospective insured, which has the
effect of an offer to purchase insurance.1 Based upon the information sup-
plied in the application, the insurer's decision to accept the offer may be
manifested in one of several ways: a binder, constituting temporary accept-
ance and revocable within a short period of time, may be issued ;2 the policy
itself may be issued, as a means of final acceptance;3 or the retention of the
application and a premium for an undue length of time may be tantamount
to acceptance. 4 In addition to the usual questions concerning name, occupa-
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American International Underwriters Corporation; author, SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF
CASUALTY CLAIMS, CASUALTY INVESTIGATION CHECK LISTS and numerous articles in
legal and insurance publications.
1. Harris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Monte-
Janssen v. Continental Cas. Co., 203 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Fort Valley Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 120, 24 S.E.2d 846 (1943);
Gisin v. Farmers Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 219 Iowa 1373, 261 N.W. 618 (1935) ; Palmer
v. Bull Dog Auto Ins. Co., 294 Ill. 287, 128 N.E. 499 (1920).
2. Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934).; Mohrstadt v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938) ; Reynolds v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
189 Iowa 76, 176 N.W. 207 (1920) ; Duncan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137
Ohio St. 441, 31 N.E.2d 88 (1940).
3. Keim v. Home Mut. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 38, 97 Am. Dec. 291 (1867)
Rayburn v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 138 N.C. 379, 50 S.E. 762 (1905) ; Gaetz v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 S.D. 125, 222 N.W. 676 (1928) ; Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Jones,
32 Tex. Civ. App. 146, 73 S.W. 978 (1903) ; Finley v. Western Empire Ins. Co., 69
Wash. 673, 125 Pac. 1012 (1912). Note, however, that even after final acceptance the
policy may be canceled at any time by either party.
4. Bellak v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 244 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Hahn v.
National Cas. Co., 64 Idaho 684, 136 P.2d 739 (1943) ; Reynolds v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., supra note 2; Cloyd v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P.2d
431 (1933) ; Robinson v. United States Benevolent Soc'y, 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211
(1903), However, ordinary delay in acting on an application is not usually construed as
acceptance. Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P.2d 731 (1934) ; Easley v.
New Zealand Ins. Co., 5 Idaho 593, 51 Pac. 418 (1897); Winchell v. Iowa State Ins.
Co., 103 Iowa 198, 72 N.W. 503 (1897) ; Moon v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan.
83, 23 P.2d 444 (1933) ; Harp v. Grangers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 49 Md. 307 (1878);
Wadsworth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 349 Mich. 240, 84 N.W.2d 513 (1957) ; Tjepkes
v. State Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 193 Minn. 505, 259 N.W. 2 (1935); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 2 Neb. 720, 89 N.W. 997 (1902) ; Hughes v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 Misc. 31, 297 N.Y.S. 116 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1937) ; Dorman v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 41 Okla. 509, 139 Pac. 262 (1914); Zaye v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34 (1940); Richmond v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
123 Tenn. 307, 130 S.W. 790 (1910) ; Northern Neck Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Turlington, 136
Va. 44, 116 S.E. 363 (1923).
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tion, address, employer's name, loss payee, and the amount and type of
coverages requested, the application may inquire into the age and marital
status of the prospective insured and other possible drivers of the subject
vehicle, physical impairments, previous cancellations, accidents, violations and
revocations, use of the automobile, and information concerning the agent's
personal knowledge of the applicant. Recent preferred risk plans require
the signature of the applicant in addition to much detailed information bearing
on the acceptability of the risk., Although much of this information is later
incorporated into the policy, the application itself never becomes a part of the
policy. 6
The portion of the policy which incorporates the information contained
in the application is the declarations-the first section of the actual automo-
bile policy. Normally, the declarations will be attached to the policy, either
as a matter of good practice or as a result of statutory mandate.7 The declara-
5. Applications vary from the ordinary type, as outlined above, to even more de-
tailed forms. Direct writing companies almost invariably now require the signature of
the applicant. It is therefore obvious that the insured may not be held to the same degree
of strict accountability in the average stock agency application which he does not sign,
that he could be under the applications requiring his signature. In some stock agency
applications, there is sometimes a doubt as to whether the information was even obtained
directly from the insured. When in doubt, a jury will usually decide against the com-
pany and herein lies the danger of submitting factual information, the source of which
could be easily in doubt.
6. At common law, the representations made by the insured in the application had
the force of warranties, upon which the underlier could rely absolutely. Any false state-
ment in the application, whether made in good or bad faith, and whether material to the
issuance of the policy or not, was sufficient to void the policy contract. See Sovereign
Camp W.O.W. v. Thompson, 234 Ala. 216, 174 So. 761 (1937) ; Amity Ass'n. v. McCall,
103 Ark. 201, 146 S.W. 125 (1912) ; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Lampkin, 5 Colo. App. 177,
38 Pac. 335 (1894) ; Sovereign Camp of W.O.W. v. McDonald, 76 Fla. 599, 80 So. 566
(1919) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kuhlenschmidt, 213 Ind. 212, 11 N.E.2d 673 (1937)
(by statute). However, it now seems generally accepted that misrepresentations by the
prospective insured in his application, unless material or made with intent to deceive,
will not impair the validity of the contract. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mossey,
195 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moldenhauer, 193 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Gates v. General Cas. Co., 120 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Hawkeye Cas. Co. v.
Western Underwriter's Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 256 (D.C. Idaho 1944) ; Standard Ace. Ins.
Co. v. Pratt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 151, 278 P.2d 489 (1955) ; Keys v. Pace, 358 Mich. 74, 99
N.W.2d 547 (1959); Carroll v. Caroline Cas. Ins. Co., 227 N.C. 456, 42 S.E.2d 607
(1947).
7. At one time there was quite a controversy as to whether the declarations had to
be physically attached to the policy in order to make them a part of it. Accordingly, there
has been quite a bit of litigation on this subject, mostly in the field of life, accident and
sickness insurance. As a result, many states have enacted statutes requiring the declara-
tions to be attached to the policy. Most of these statutes confine themselves specifically to
life, accident and sickness coverages. Others, like the New York statute, are silent and
require court interpretation to declare whether they apply to liability policies.
Several courts have held that where statements in the application were false (in
these cases, concerning previous cancellation), and the policy was issued in reliance on
the false statements, the failure of the application to be attached to the policy was im-
material. Klim v. Johnson, 16 I1. App. 2d 484, 148 N.E.2d 828 (1958) ; Safeco Ins. Co.
v. Gonacha, 142 Colo. 170, 350 P.2d 189 (1960). Since the statutes are constantly under-
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tions condition, which is included in the body of the Standard Automobile
Policy,8 reads:
By acceptance of this policy the named insured agrees that the state-
ments in the declarations are his agreements and representations,
that this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of such repre-
sentations and that this policy embodies all agreements existing be-
tween himself and the company or any other agent relating to this
insurance.
Accordingly, even if the declarations are not physically attached to the policy,
it is intended that they become a part of it because of this condition.
WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS
In the early days of insurance, the effectiveness of statements made in
the application or in the declarations was relatively easy to determine. Any
statement made by the insured which became a part of the policy itself in
the declarations was considered a warranty, upon which the insurer could
rely absolutely. The validity of the insurance therefore depended upon the
literal truth of the statements made by the applicant for insurance-his good
faith or ulterior motive was immaterial.9 The obvious harshness of this rule
has been gradually vitiated through the years, and today the statements in
the declarations are usually treated as representations, the falsity of which
will not automatically and necessarily void coverage under the policy. 10 The
extent to which misrepresentation of a specific declaration in an automobile
policy will be fatal to coverage under the policy is the subject of inquiry in
this Article.
INFORMATION INCLUDED
The declarations in the Standard Automobile Policy include: a listing
of coverages available, specifying coverages purchased; the named insured,
his address, occupation, and the principal place where the automobile is to
be garaged; the loss payee, if any; a designation of the insured for purposes
of coverage C-2; the policy period; a description of the automobile and
facts representing its purchase by the named insured (including terms of any
encumbrance) ; the purposes for which the automobile is to be used; the
total number of private passenger automobiles owned by the insured; a state-
going changes in wording or interpretation, great care must be exercised to make sure
that the wording and interpretation are up to date.
8. For commentary on the latest (1955) revision of the Standard Automobile Policy,
see Thomas, The New Standard Automobile Policy: Other Provisions (Declarations and
Conditions), 1955 INs. L.J. 652 (1955).
9. Woolmor v. Muilman, 3 Burr. 1419 (K.B. 1763).
10. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 96 Cal. App. 2d 778, 216 P.2d 565 (1950) ; Teeple
v. Fraternal Bankers' Reserve Soc'y, 179 Iowa 65, 161 N.W. 102 (1917) ; Cassidy v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 Mass. 160, 154 N.E.2d 353 (1958).
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ment concerning sole ownership of the automobile; and a statement concern-
ing previous cancellation of policies. As previously indicated, the declara-
tions incorporate much of the information supplied by the insured on his
application," and they become the first section of the policy. These specific
declarations and some additional representations will be examined separately.
Policy Period
The suggested declaration in the Standard Automobile Policy form con-
cerning the end of the policy period includes the wording "12:01 A.M.,
standard time at the address of the named insured as stated herein." Coverage
begins at the date and hour on which the policy is written, and it seems
obvious that the date of the accident must fall within the policy period men-
tioned in the declarations.1 2 It has been held, however, that mutual mistake
as to the effective date of the policy is ground for reformation.
13
Regarding policy renewal, a delay in premium payment until after the
renewal date, in the absence of a definite cancellation notice, will not alter
the effective policy period stated in the declarations. 14 However, it has been
11. Two standard areas of inquiry in applications for automobile insurance which
are usually not incorporated into the declarations concern previous drivers' license revoca-
tions and physical condition of the insured.
Whether or not a misrepresentation regarding previous revocations will be held to
void coverage would seem to depend on the materiality of the representation to the
acceptance of the risk. Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1958) ;
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp. 289 (D.C. Md. 1957); Keys v.
Pace, supra note 6; Haas v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 198, 90 N.W.2d 146
(1958). Generally, this type of information bears a substantial relationship to the risk;
however, a revocation resulting from failure to have a muffler on a car cannot be said to
affect greatly the acceptability of a risk. See Mayflower Ins. Exch. v. Gilmont, 280
F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1960); Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. v. Betton, 152 N.E.2d 454 (C.P. Ohio
1958). Where an insured stated that his license had never been suspended, whereas in
actuality it had been suspended during a period when he was confined to a mental insti-
tution, the misrepresentation was not fatal to the coverage. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger,
400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960). On the other hand, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 96
Cal. App. 2d 778, 216 P.2d 565 (1950), a misrepresentation concerning a conviction for
drunken driving was held sufficiently material to void the policy ab initio.
Regarding physical condition of the insured, many courts have held that a material
misrepresentation in the application is sufficient to void the policy. A California court so
held in a case where the insured lied about his faulty vision. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Pratt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 151, 278 P.2d 489 (1955). The same result was reached in
Minich v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. App. 1959). Conversely it has
been held that a material misrepresentation as to physical condition, which did not be-
come a part of the declarations, was not sufficient cause to void the policy in the absence
of fraud. See Harris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956).
12. Patterson v. Manhattan Mut. Auto. Cas. Co., 329 II1. App. 219, 67 N.E.2d 696
(1946) ; Stevens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 253 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. App. 1952).
13. National Indem. Co., Inc. v. Smith-Gandy, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 124, 309 P.2d 742
(1957).
14. Tyler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 244 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Penn-




held that an insured must accept an offer to renew an expired policy before
an accident occurs.
15
Where someone applies for insurance after an accident has occurred
and fraudulently conceals this fact, thereby inducing the agent to commence
coverage on the policy on the same day that an accident occurred, the courts
will not allow the insured to profit by his fraudulent concealment.1 6 Many
courts have indicated a willingness to be much more lenient, however, on
coverage determinations where no fraud is involved or at least proven. A
federal court has, for instance, held that a renewal of an insurance policy after
an accident had occurred was valid since the renewal was made by the




Item 8 of the suggested declarations in the 1955 version of the Standard
Automobile Policy reads:
Except with respect to bailment lease, conditional sale, purchase
agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance, the named insured is the
sole owner of the automobile, unless otherwise stated herein.
This is one of the most important declarations in the policy. The insurer
wants to know, and has the right to know, with whom it is dealing. It is
assumed that the owner will be at least the principal if not the only driver,
and that he will at least be vitally concerned as to who drives the car.
The general rule concerning misrepresentation in the declaration of "sole
ownership" of a vehicle is that it is material to the acceptance of a risk and,
therefore, voids coverage or at least makes it voidable at the option of the
insurer.' 8 Some of the cases arrive at the same conclusion simply on the
basis of a breach of warranty.19 A contrary result obtains, however, where
the misrepresentation is not material to the acceptance of the risk as, for in-
15. Boone v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 192 Va. 672, 66 S.E.2d 530 (1951).
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 236 Miss. 851, 112 So. 2d 366
(1959).
17. Canadian Indem. Co. v. Tacke, 257 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958).
18. Bettinger v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., 213 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Didlake
v. Standard Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1952); New Zealand Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. La. 1954); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Powers, 113 F.
Supp. 126 (D.C. Va. 1953) ; Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Western Underwriters' Ass'n, 53 F.
Supp. 256 (D.C. Idaho 1944) ; Builders & Mfrs. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp.
858 (D.C. Me. 1938) ; Western States Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. May, 18 II1. App. 2d 442,
152 N.E.2d 608 (1958) ; Kelly Contracting Co. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 240 S.W.2d
60 (Ky. 1951) ; Cassidy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 Mass. 139, 154 N.E.2d 353 (1958) ;
McCracken v. Car & Gen. Ins. Corp., 94 N.H. 474, 55 A.2d 894 (1947) ; Republic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Faught, 83 Ohio App. 31, 82 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
19. Bowen v. Bernard, 86 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1936) ; Rondina v. Employers' Liab.
Assur. Corp., 286 Mass. 209, 190 N.E. 35 (1935) ; Century Indem. Co. v. Simon, 77
F. Supp. 221 (D.C.N.J. 1948).
1962]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
stance, in the case of an individual rather than a corporate owner, as stated
in the declarations, where the representation involved no additional exposure.
20
Many states have enacted statutes governing the effectiveness of state-
ments made in the application for, and in the declarations of, automobile
policies. In American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Backstrom,2 1 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court upheld a statute declaring that misrepresentation must
be made with intent to deceive in order to void coverage. In another case,
however, the same court held that a misrepresentation concerning "sole owner-
ship" by a father in favor of his 16-year-old son was not fraudulently made
and therefore did not void coverage.2 2 Since the misrepresentation was ob-
viously made to induce the insurer into issuing the policy, the result seems
questionable. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently rendered a deci-
sion in accordance with a statute declaring that misrepresentation in a declara-
tion will not void a policy unless made with intent to deceive, or unless the
misrepresentation increased the hazard or contributed to the loss. 23
A determination of who is the owner of a vehicle involves defining such
terms as "title," "registration," "equitable ownership," "real owner" and
many others employed in the statutes and court decisions. Generally speaking,
the question of ownership is a factual determination for the jury.24 It has
been held that the person who held the title and paid the chattel mortgage
and the insurance premium was in fact the owner of the automobile, even
though it was regularly used by someone else.25 The majority rule is that,
although a certificate of title creates a presumption of ownership, it is no
more than refutable evidence of ownership.2 6
20. See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Presbitero & Sons, Inc., 209 F.2d 281 (7th
Cir. 1954). Although questionable at best, the same result has been reached in cases
where the misrepresentation was by a father in favor of his son, or by a grandmother
for her grandson. Mid-States Ins. Co. v. Brandon, 340 Ill. App. 470, 92 N.E.2d 540
(1950) ; Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Herzer, 279 P.2d 329 (Okla. 1954).
21. 47 Wash. 2d 77, 287 P.2d 124 (1955).
22. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Hanson, 42 Wash. 2d 256, 254 P.2d 494 (1953).
23. Kietlinski v. Interstate Transp. Lines, 3 Wis. 2d 451, 88 N.W.2d 739 (1958).
24. Mercer Cas. Co. v. Ranes, 105 Ind. App. 470, 15 N.E.2d 746 (1938) ; Hawkeye
Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951). A Louisiana decision, however,
has held that since the determination of ownership is a conclusion of law, the representa-
tions of the individuals involved concerning ownership were of no effect. Churchman v.
Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1951).
25. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 230 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1956). A
Mississippi decision has held that an equitable title which could enable the holder to
obtain legal title is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the "sole ownership" declara-
tion. Ford v. American Home Assur. Co., 192 Miss. 277, 5 So. 2d 416 (1942).
26. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Zabloski, 292 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1961)
Abraham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 215 Iowa 1, 244 N.W. 675 (1932) ; Musso v. Amer-
ican Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 14 Misc. 2d 450, 178 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1958) ; Green v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 61 N.D. 376, 237 N.W. 794 (1931) ; Pioneer Mut. Compensa-
tion Co. v. Diaz, 142 Tex. 184, 177 S.W.2d 202 (1943) ; United States Cas. Co. v. Bain,
191 Va. 717, 62 S.E.2d 814 (1951) ; Kietlinski v. Interstate Transp. Lines, supra note 23.
A few courts, however, have held that legal title, and therefore ownership, is ac-
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Transfer of title during a policy period without notification to the in-
surance company presents problems, particularly where a renewal of the
policy is involved. In a case involving a failure to notify the insurer of a
title transfer even upon renewal of the policy, it has been held that the mis-
representation made upon renewal of the policy was not material because
the named insured transferred title to the automobile to a corporation of
which he was an officer, and because the policy provided coverage arising
not only from ownership of the auto but also from its maintenance and use.
2
1
A Pennsylvania decision has held that, because legal ownership had not passed
from the deceased titleholder to the heir at the time of the accident, and
since the heir was not named in the policy, coverage was denied to him.
2 8
The question of the validity of insurance on a stolen vehicle often arises,
Since a thief cannot pass better title than he himself has, the majority view
holds that a bona fide purchaser of a stolen car does not have "sole owner-
ship" as required by the declarations. 29 The minority view, on the contrary,
holds that a bona fide purchaser has good title against everyone except the
real owner and is therefore properly covered under the policy.30 This line
of argument conveniently forgets the word "sole" before "ownership" in the
declaration.
In the instance where the insurance agent knows of the misrepresenta-
tion of the "sole ownership" declaration, the general rule is that the insurer
is bound by the knowledge of its agent and accordingly waives its right to
disclaim coverage.3 1 This result, however, disregards the changes condition
quired when a person receives certificate of title properly completed. Kane v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 252 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Kelso v. Kelso, 306 S.W.2d 534 (Mo.
1957). An old Missouri case held that failure merely to register the title certificate could
not be construed as improper ownership so as to void coverage. Howell v. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 215 Mo. App. 386, 257 S.W. 178 (1924). Ohio, on the contrary, has held
in at least two cases that failure to register the title certificate results in failure properly
to transfer ownership. Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio 539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953) ; Ohio
Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Todino, 111 Ohio 274, 145 N.E. 25 (1924). A New York decision
held that the statute requiring registration of ownership did not operate against an in-
surer to enforce coverage where ownership in fact was not as indicated on the declara-
tion. In this case the insured sold his car but the buyer failed to register his ownership.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Guthiel, 161 N.Y.2d 874, 141 N.E.2d 909 (1957).
27. Tyrnauer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 293, 223 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1961).
In another case the insured company transferred title in a truck to one of its employee
drivers without notifying the insurer. In this case, however, the court held that since
the insured company would have been covered under the omnibus clause in any event,
had proper notification been made, the title change was not sufficiently material to void
the policy. Abrams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 N.Y. 80, 89 N.E.2d 235 (1949).
28. Antone v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 335 Pa. 134, 6 A.2d 566 (1939).
29. Giles v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 207, 122 S.E. 890 (1924) ; Hessen v.
Iowa Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 Iowa 141, 190 N.W. 150 (1922) ; Royal Ins. Co. v. Shirley,
142 Miss. 249, 106 So. 884 (1926).
30. Norris v. Alliance Ins. Co., 1 N.J. Misc. 315, 123 Atl. 762 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
Savarese v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 N.J.L. 435, 123 Ati. 763 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924).
31. General Ins. Co. v. Western Fire & Cas. Co., 241 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1957);
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of the policy32 specifically inserted in order to preclude waiver by the company
where the agent had knowledge of the misrepresentation-in the present in-
stance-concerning "sole ownership." A few courts have given effect to the
changes condition in this situation.
3 3
Age of Owner and Principal Driver
The suggested declarations in the latest revision of the Standard Auto-
mobile Policy omit mention of the age of the owner or principal driver. This
seems indeed odd in the light of proven bad experience of youthful drivers.
Many independent companies have made some provisions for a declaration
concerning the age of the principal driver, in addition to the information
requested in the application.
Oddly enough, there are very few decisions concerning misrepresentation
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Holm, 190 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Show,
110 F. Supp. 523 (D.C. Mont. 1953) ; Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Friedley, 79 F. Supp.
978 (D.C. Iowa 1948); Mercer Cas. Co. v. Ranes, 105 Ind. App. 470, 15 N.E.2d 746
(1938) ; Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 Atl. 136 (1931) ; American
Ins. Co. v. Jueschke, 110 Okla. 250, 237 Pac. 585 (1925) ; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Lucas, 281 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App. 1955) ; Miller v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 187 Wash.
629, 60 P.2d 714 (1936) ; Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 411, 90 N.W.2d 562
(1958).
32. The changes condition represents an attempt to preclude waiver or estoppel
being successfully asserted against the insurer because of an agent's knowledge of mis-
representations made by the insured. The standard changes condition reads:
Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other per-
sons shall not effect a waiver or a change in any part of this policy or estop the
company from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the
terms of this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form
a part of this policy.
Unfortunately, many of the courts either have been unaware of this condition, have dis-
regarded it completely, or have not given it the weight that was intended. The following
cases hold the insurer estopped from denying coverage, despite the changes condition.
Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Lantz, 246 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 228 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Champ, 225 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Show, 110 F. Supp. 523
(D.C. Mont. 1953); American Sur. Co. v. Heise, 136 Cal. App. 2d. 689, 289 P.2d 103
(1955) ; Hardware Indem. Ins. Co. v. Sprouse, 308 Ky. 332, 214 S.W.2d 407 (1948);
Boyd v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 50 So. 2d 688 (La. App. 1951) ; Saunders v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 55, 151 N.E.2d 1 (1958) ; Miller v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co.,
187 Wash. 629, 60 P.2d 714 (1936). On the other hand, a number of courts have given
due consideration and weight to this condition and have held that it avoids waiver by
the insurer despite knowledge by the agent of the falsity of the representations made by
the insured. State Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Kooiman, 143 F. Supp. 614 (D.C.S.D. 1956);
Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Ford, 120 F. Supp. 118 (D.C.N.M. 1954) ; Trinity Universal Ins.
Co. v. Woody, 47 F. Supp. 327 (D.C.N.J. 1942) ; Klim v. Johnson, supra note 7; Citi-
zens Cas. Co. v. Zambrano Trucking Co., 141 N.J. Eq. 310, 57 A.2d 17 (Ct. Err. & App.
1948) ; Gendron v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 47 N.M. 348, 143 P.2d 462 (1943) ; Euto v.
(American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 247 App. Div. 613, 288 N.Y.S. 232 (1936);
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 226 N.C. 574, 39 S.E.2d 741 (1946) ; Plotner v.
Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 94 Ohio. App. 94, 114 N.E.2d 629 (1952) ; Christian v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 144 W. Va. 746, 110 S.E.2d 845 (1959).
33. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Woody, supra note 32; Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Faught, supra note 18.
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of age in the application. Most of the decisions involving the age of the
driver are tied in with the "sole ownership" declaration which has been
discussed. A recent decision held that misrepresentation of age in the appli-
cation was material and sufficient to void the policy despite the fact that the
answer in the application was not made a part of the policy by inclusion in
the declarations. Here, the owner and principal driver had declared that
he was 25 years of age when in actuality he was only 20.3
4
Place of Principal Garaging
A subsection of Item 1 of the suggested declarations under the Standard
Automobile Policy states that "the automobile will be principally garaged in
the above town (or city), county and state, unless otherwise stated herein."
It is to be noted that -previous wording which included "and used" after
"garaged" has been eliminated. Despite elimination of the words requiring
use of the automobile at the place designated, a recent decision has included
these words by implication. In Republic Indemnity Co. v. Martin,3 5 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a difference in the principal place of
garaging was not sufficient to warrant voiding the policy and stated that the
principal place of use of the car was the more determinative factor. It is dif-
ficult to follow the logic of the court in view of the difficulty in separating
principal place of use from principal place of garaging, and particularly in
view of the absence of the words "and use" from the policy declarations
involved in this decision.
It would seem unrealistic to expect a court to interpret the word "ga-
raged" in such a narrow fashion as to eliminate overnight parking in a lot
or even in the street. Accordingly, it does not seem that a New York court
put any particular burden upon logic when it ruled that a car stolen during
the night from a vacant lot was "garaged" so as to come within the require-
ments of the declarationa 6
The early decisions involving the declaration of place of garaging con-
strued the representation strictly as a warranty.3 7 Some decisions went so
far as to say that even though the declaration concerning the place of prin-
cipal use and garaging was true when made, a subsequent change of address
without notice to the insurer was sufficient breach to void the policy. 8 The
34. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mossey, supra note 6.
35. 222 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1955).
36. Lukin v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 266 App. Div. 282, 42 N.Y.S.2d 237
(1943).
37. Marone v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 114 N.J.L. 295, 176 Atl. 320 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935); Lummus v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 167 N.C. 654, 83 S.E. 688 (1914);
Sawyer v. National Fire Ins. Co., 53 S.D. 228, 220 N.W. 503 (1928) ; North River Ins.
Co. v. Lewis, 137 Va. 322, 119 S.E. 43 (1923).
38. As late as 1941 it was held that where a vehicle had been moved from one area,
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reasoning of these decisions seems to be holding up in instances where there
is a rate differential between the areas and where obvious fraud is involved.a9
However, several cases where the insured moved and failed to notify the
insurer of his change of address have held that this declaration was not
breached because it did not contain any explicit undertaking that the insured
would keep the car principally at the place designated.
40
An agent's knowledge concerning change of address and principal place
of garaging is tantamount to knowledge by the company, and accordingly can-
not be used against the insured to void his policy.41 Furthermore, insurers
have been held to waive the place of garaging declaration by action incon-
sistent with repudiation after they became chargeable with knowledge or
notice of the wrong address.42 However, a Massachusetts court has held that
continuation of the insured's defense after disclaimer (upon discovery of a
misrepresentation concerning address and place of garaging) did not constitute
waiver where the defense attorney informed the court that he was disclaiming
but continuing his defense merely for the benefit of the defendant. 43 These
cases emphasize the necessity for care on the part of the insurer to take some
action to protect its interests by way of reservation of rights so that it does
not waive any defense which it may have concerning coverage under the
policy.
Occupation Declaration
The possible requirement that the insured name his occupation is tied
in with another declaration-that of "purpose of use"-which results in the
two often being considered together. For instance, in a case where the in-
sured was on business inconsistent with the "purpose of use" declaration,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed coverage because the
actual use was in furtherance of the insured's occupation as stated in the
declarations.44 In this case the insured was engaged chiefly in the occupation
of delivering beer to retail outlets. He was only incidentally engaged in the
where the premium rate was lower, to another area where the rate was higher, failure
to notify the insurer was a material breach of the policy declaration. Connecticut Indem.
Co. v. Howe, 41 F. Supp. 222 (D.C. Cal. 1941); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cole, 156 Va.
707, 158 S.E. 873 (1931).39. Purcell v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 230, 64 P.2d 1114 (1937)
Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Georgiana, 14 N.J. Super. 459, 82 A.2d 217 (Ch.
Div. 1951).
40. Sandahl v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 229 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Sutton
v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 138 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1943); Universal Underwriters v. Gran,
114 N.E.2d 501 (C.P. Ohio 1952).
41. Boyd v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 50 So. 2d 688 (La. App. 1951).
42. See Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Md. 1939);
Klefbeck v. Dous, 302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 308 (1939).
43. Sanborn v. Brunette, 315 Mass. 231, 52 N.E.2d 384 (1943).
44. E.T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Virginia Sur. Co., 219 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1955).
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business of hauling other freight. In the declarations he had listed his occu-
pation as "truck owner and driver." As long as there was no conflict between
his occupation as listed and the use of the truck, the court held that there
was no misrepresentation.
In another case wherein the car was being used while the named in-
sured was engaged as a volunteer fireman, a California appellate court said
that there was no contradiction between this use and the insured's statement
that his occupation was that of "rancher. ' 4  Note that the use was only
incidental and did not belie the occupation declaration. On the other hand,
where the insured is guilty of deliberate misstatements intended to induce
the insurance company to issue a policy, the courts almost uniformly hold
in favor of the insurance company unless other factors are involved. In one
case, the named insured deliberately misstated his occupation as being that




Item 5 of the suggested declarations in the Standard Automobile Policy
requires a description of the automobile and facts respecting its purchase by
the named insured, usually including the year, model, trade name, model name,
body type, serial and motor numbers, number of cylinders, purchase price,
date purchased, whether purchased new or used, and the nature of any en-
cumbrances or mortgages on the car. It is to be noted that the Standard
Family Automobile Policy contains no provision for the description of the
automobile and, accordingly, any controversy arising under that policy will
have no bearing on the present discussion.
There are comparatively few recent decisions involving the description
of the automobile. This is obviously because the same yardstick is used here
as with many other sections of the declarations, namely, whether or not the
misrepresentation was material. It would seem from the trend of recent
decisions on coverage matters that there are relatively few situations where
it could be argued with any real conviction that the misrepresentation was,
material enough to void coverage. Most of the decisions involve a mistake
or misrepresentation concerning the model or year of the car, the serial or
engine numbers, or failure to inform the insured that a new car had been
purchased.
45. Farmer's Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Calkins, 39 Cal. App. 2d 390, 103 P.2d 230
(1940).
46. New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 123 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. La. 1954). Where
the named insured, who was a serviceman at the time, declared that he was a civilian
painter, the court held the misrepresentation material since it affected the acceptance of
the risk and, accordingly, sufficient to void the policy. Carruth v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 113 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1959).
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The early cases dealing with description of the vehicle followed the
warranty theory, holding that any misstatement, even of model, year or serial
number, was fatal.4 7 This result often obtained irrespective of good faith on
the part of the insured.48 An exception to this rule has often been made in
cases where the agent knew, or by proper inspection could have known, that
the description was inaccurate.49  The trend in the more recent decisions is
to hold that a misdescription of the vehicle must have been material in order
to void coverage." °
In the case of a replaced automobile, a Maryland court indicated that a
wrong description was not a material failure, especially since the policy in
that case provided coverage for any newly acquired vehicle which replaced
an insured automobile, without notice of replacement. 5 Some courts have
permitted reformation of the policy contract where there had been a mutual
mistake in the designation of the vehicle involved, or where there was fraud
or unconscionable conduct.5 2 Recent cases involving a wrong description of
a minor nature, but where there was apparently no question concerning the in-
tended car to be covered, and where the rate differential was either non-existent
or minor, have been uniformly decided in favor of the insured and against
the insurance company. The decisions are obviously equitable and it is re-
47. Bennett v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 84 Cal. App. 130, 257 Pac. 586 (1927) ;
Simons v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 258 Mass. 210, 154 N.E. 768 (1927); Douglas v. In-
surance Co. of No. America, 215 Mich. 529, 184 N.W. 539 (1921) ; Andrews v. Bull
Dog Auto. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 258 S.W. 714 (Mo. 1924) ; Smith v. American Auto. Ins.
Co., 188 Mo. App. 297, 175 S.W. 113 (1915) ; Saglineni v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 132 Misc. 122, 228 N.Y.S. 537 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Harris v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 126 N.Y.S. 118 (N.Y. City Ct. 1910) ; Butler v. Rhode Island Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 54 R.I. 204, 171 Atl. 328 (1934) ; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Winter, 67 S.W.2d
926 (Texas 1934) ; North River Ins. Co. v. Atkinson, 137 Va. 313, 119 S.E. 46 (1923);
Day v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 111 Wash. 49, 189 Pac. 95 (1920).
48. See Felakos v. Aetna Ins. Co., 119 Atl. 277 (N.J. 1922) ; Automobile Owners'
Ins. Ass'n v. Hennessy, 299 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1927).
49. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 24 Ariz. 86, 206 Pac. 1081 (1922)
Buysse v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 240 II1. App. 324 (1926) ; Alexander v. Home Ins.
Co., 142 So. 708 (La. 1932) ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Loving, 163 Miss. 114,
140 So. 727 (1932) ; Berryman v. Maryland Motorcar Ins. Co., 119 Mo. App. 503, 204
S.W. 738 (1918).
50. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Long, 85 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1936); North
British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Sec. Corp., 30 Ariz. 599, 249 Pac. 761
(1926) ; Wyman v. Security Ins. Co., 202 Cal. 743, 262 Pac. 329 (1927) ; White v. Home
Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 189 Iowa 1051, 179 N.W. 315 (1920) ; Hardware Indem. Ins. Co. v.
Sprouse, 308 Ky. 332, 214 S.W.2d 407 (1948).
In Devenny v. Automobile Owners' Inter-Ins. Ass'n, 124 Wash. 453, 214 Pac. 833
(1923), the Washington Supreme Court held that there must have been an intent to
deceive in order to void coverage.
51. Maryland Indem. & Fire Ins. Exch. v. Steers, 221 Md. 380, 157 A.2d 803
(1960).
52. McKnight v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 159 F. Supp. 625 (D.C. Ark. 1958); Barnes v.
Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 151 Cal. App.. 2d 669, 311 P.2d 871 (Cal. App. 1957) ; Amer-
ican Cas. Co. v. Ricas, 179 Md. 627, 22 A.2d 484 (1941) ; Johnson v. National Mut. Ins.
Co., 175 Md. 543, 3 A.2d 460 (1939).
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markable that an insurance carrier would have made an issue of coverage
on such flimsy grounds. 53 The trend of these decisions suggests that the
courts are not inclined to deprive an insured of coverage where the mistake
in description is not of a material nature and where there was no real
intent to deceive. The additional fact that the Standard Family Automobile
Policy does not require a description of the vehicle makes this particular
problem a continually diminishing one.
Purchase Price of the Vehicle
Historically, some courts held to the old warranty doctrine and refused
coverage where there was a misrepresentation as to the purchase price, par-
ticularly if the misrepresentation was deliberate.5 4 While most of these early
decisions were made before the advent of the Standard Automobile Policy,
there is no substantial difference in the wording of this declaration in the
various forms, including the suggested standard wording.
Although there is some argument concerning the basis for controversy
as to the value of a vehicle after an accident in discussing the settlement of a
claim, most policies are now written on an actual cash value basis, and the
insurance premium is rated on the basis of the fair market value, for the
purposes of physical damage coverage. Accordingly, in the light of the trend
in recent decisions, there is little question that most courts would consider a
misrepresentation of purchase price as being not material.55
Use of Automobile
Item 6 of the declarations of the Standard Automobile Policy reads:
The purposes for which the automobile is to be used are "pleasure
and business" unless otherwise stated herein.
The policy may at the option of the insured define "pleasure and business"
and the alternative "commercial" as follows:
(a) The term "pleasure and business" is defined as personal, pleas-
ure, family and business use.
(b) The term "commercial" is defined as use principally in the busi-
53. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Long, 85 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1936) ; Kostecki v.
Zaffina, 384 Ill. 192, 51 N.E.2d 152 (1943) ; Fucaloro v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., 225
Iowa 437, 280 N.W. 605 (1938); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 190 Miss. 533,
1 So. 2d 225 (1941) ;' Gresham Petroleum Transp., Inc. v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 228
N.C. 144, 44 S.E.2d 731 (1947). In one case, the court went so far as to state that even
where the motor and chassis had been replaced, the insurer could not deny coverage
despite the fact that the insured had given no notification concerning the change. W. I.
Anderson & Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 672, 194 S.E. 281 (1937).
54. Standard Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. West, 203 Ky. 335, 262 S.W. 296 (1924) ; Wein-
roth v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ass'n Fire Ins. Co., 117 N.J.L. 436, 189 Atl. 73 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1937) ; Butter v. Rhode Island Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 54 R.I. 204, 171 Atl. 328 (1934)
Day v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 111 Wash. 49, 189 Pac. 95 (1920).
55. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Huff, 172 S.W. 755 (Texas 1915).
1962]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ness occupation of the named insured as stated in Item 1, in-
cluding occasional use for personal, pleasure, family and other
business purposes.
The Standard Family Automobile Policy and the 1959 Special Package Poli-
cies contain no "purpose of use" declaration.
Initially, in the days of the strict warranty interpretation, it was essential
that the use of the vehicle be one permitted by the policy declarations or the
policy was declared void. 56 Coverage was denied in one case because the subject
vehicle was not being used in furtherance of the stated occupation at the
time of the accident, notwithstanding the qualification in the declarations,
"occasional use for other purposes. '57 However, even a few of the early cases
held that occasional use for other purposes would not void coverage.
58
Most of the recent decisions hold that occasional use for business pur-
poses not connected with the insured's occupation as stated in the declarations
does not void the coverage where the description of the use is "commercial." 59
Several cases have gone beyond this and have held that description of the
use as "commercial" does not confine business use to the purposes listed in
the declarations.6 ° These cases seem to imply that this is so even where the
other use is more than occasional. Some cases have held that the word
"business" in the phrase "pleasure and business" is not limited to the business
occupation as stated in Item 1 of the declarations.61 Several courts have held
that pleasure and business use covers the automobile when used by a volunteer
fireman in the course of his duties as such.6 2 Where the specific use of the
automobile, however, is definitely forbidden by a policy exclusion, such as the
taxi or livery exclusion, use in the forbidden fashion voids the policy.
3
Cancellation Declaration
The cancellation declaration in the original Standard Automobile Policy
of 1936 read: "No insurer has canceled any similar insurance issued to the
56. Johnston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 200 N.C. 763, 158 S.E. 473 (1931);
Drewek v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 207 Wis. 445, 240 N.W. 881 (1932).
57. Gibbs v. Employers' Mut. Liab. & Ins. Co., 224 N.C. 462, 31 S.E.2d 377 (1944).
58. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Rye, 160 Ark. 212, 254 S.W. 465 (1923) ; Auto. Ins. Exch.
v. Wilson, 144 Md. 249, 124 Atl. 876 (1923) ; Murphy & Co. v. Manufacturer's Cas. Co.,
89 Pa. Super. 281 (1926).
59. Virginia Sur. Co. v. E.T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co., 219 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.
1955) ; Stanley v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 195 Md. 180, 73 A.2d 1 (1950) ; Kiet-
linski v. Interstate Transp, Lines, 3 Wis. 451, 88 N.W.2d 739 (1958) ; but see Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1956).
60. Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App. 1939); Terrasi v. Pierce, 304
Mass. 409, 23 N.E.2d 871 (1939).
61. Tannenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 382, 134 A.2d 817 (1957);
Pauli v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 255 App. Div. 935, 8 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1938).
62. Farmers Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Calkins, supra note 45; Pauli v. St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co., supra note 61.
63. See Warren v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co., 205 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. App. 1947).
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named insured [nor declined to issue such insurance] during the past year,
except as herein stated." The wording contained within the brackets was
optional and could be omitted at the discretion of the insurer. In the third
revision of the Standard Automobile Policy in 1941, the wording of this
declaration was changed to: "During the past year no insurer has canceled any
automobile insurance issued to the named insured except as herein stated."
The optional wording was dropped entirely. Otherwise, although some of
the words were rearranged, the meaning remained the same. The fourth
revision of 1947 gave the companies the option of excluding the entire declara-
tion concerning previous cancellation, apparently on the theory that it was no
longer needed.
Underwriting results in the 1950's proved this assumption wrong, and
by 1955, the date of the fifth revision, this declaration was not only replaced,
but enhanced to cover a period of three previous years instead of one. The
1955 version reads: "During the past three years no insurer has canceled
insurance, issued to the named insured, similar to that afforded hereunder,
unless otherwise stated herein."
The general rule, and by far the prevailing opinion of our courts, is that
a breach of the cancellation declaration is material to the acceptance of a
risk and therefore either voids the policy, or makes it voidable. 64 At least
one court has reached this result even when the mistake was made uninten-
tionally and in good faith. 65 Several decisions, although technically correct,
appear to have been made on the basis of semantic evasion. In each instance,
after having received notice of cancellation of a current policy to be effective
in the immediate future, the applicant made a declaration to the effect that
no previous insurance had been canceled. The courts held that because
cancellation had not actually taken effect, the insureds had not made false
statements concerning previous cancellation. 66 It has also been decided (more
64. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moldenhauer, 193 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1952) ; State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Gaekle, 131 F. Supp. 745 (D.C. Ind. 1955) ; Tri-State Ins. Co.
v. Ford, 120 F. Supp 118 (D.C.N.M. 1954); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orloff, 106 F. Supp.
114 (D.C. Mich. 1952); Heuer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 Cal. App. 2d 497, 125 P.2d 90
(1942) ; Drake v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 Colo. 170, 350 P.2d 566 (1960) ;
Klim v. Johnson, 16 Ill. App. 2d 484, 148 N.E.2d 828 (1958) ; Citizens Cas. Co. v. Zam-
brano Trucking Co., supra note 32; Lara v. Swicker, 154 Ohio St. 341, 96 N.E.2d 196
(1950); Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 66 Ohio App. 522, 35 N.E.2d 467 (1940);
Strong v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 76 S.D. 367, 78 N.W.2d 828 (1956) ; Haas v.
Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 198, 90 N.W.2d 146 (1958).
It should be noted that these cases concern only unilateral cancellation by the in-
surance company. The very word of the declaration obviates its application when can-
cellation is made by or at the request of the insured. Likewise, cancellation by mutual
consent that does not involve any reflection on the insured should not be considered a
breach of the cancellation declaration if the insured fails to mention it.
65. Minich v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. App. 1959).
66. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Erickson, 227 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Buffalo Ins. Co.
v. Best, 312 S.W.2d 270 (Texas 1958).
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soundly, perhaps) that for the purposes of this declaration "previous can-
cellation" took place when notice was received by the insured, 67 since the
intent of the question in the application seemed obvious.
In dealing with the cancellation declaration, some courts have given
proper consideration to the changes condition 6s of the policy, and have held
that this condition avoids waiver by the insurer despite knowledge by the
agent of the falsity of statements concerning previous cancellation. 6 Some
courts still seem to disregard the changes condition and hold that knowledge
by the agent concerning the insured's misrepresentation of a cancellation
declaration, as with other misrepresentations, is knowledge by the company
and waives the company's right to disclaim. 70 When the misrepresentation
was actually made by the agent without the instigation of the insured, it is
not surprising that the courts hold the latter blameless.71
Past Accidents and Traffic Violations
Questions concerning the past accident record and traffic violation record
of the insured or prospective insured are becoming routine on the application
for automobile insurance; however, comparatively few companies include the
answers to these questions in the declarations. This undoubtedly accounts
for the paucity of decisions concerning the insured's past accident or traffic
record. The few decisions that are available have held that false representa-
tions concerning previous traffic violations and accidents were material mis-
representations sufficient to void the policy.7 2
CONCLUSIONS
The law of warranties and representations has been so beclouded that
even when a statement is called a warranty, it may not be so construed. The
phraseology has become obsolete, and the courts now talk about false state-
ments and misrepresentations in the application or in the declarations. A
review of the decisions and the statutes pertinent to automobile insurance
reveals that, in addition to the requirement that there be a misrepresentation,
there are six elements that are involved either singly or in combination in
order to void coverage. These elements reduced to questions are:
67. Klim v. Johnson, supra note 64.
68. See note 32 supra.
69. Klim v. Johnson, supra note 64; Citizens Cas. Co. v. Zambrano Trucking Co.,
supra note 32; Lara v. Swicker, supra note 64; Christian v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 144 W. Va. 746, 110 S.E.2d 845 (1959).
70. See Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Holcomb, 302 Mich. 591, 5 N.W.2d 477 (1942).
71. See Jung v. Siegel, 314 Ill. App. 67, 40 N.E.2d 840 (1942) ; Saunders v. All-
state Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 55, 151 N.E.2d 1 (1958).
72. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp. 289 (D.C. Md. 1957)
Gates v. General Cas. Co., 120 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gonacha,
142 Colo. 170, 350 P.2d 189 (1961) ; Charlton v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 276, 216 P.2d 370
(1950) ; Haas v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 64.
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1. Was the misstatement made with the intent to deceive? In other
words, was there a deliberate fraud?
2. Was the misstatement one of a material fact?
3. Did the misstatement contribute to the loss?
4. Did the misstatement increase the hazard which was being insured?
5. Did the misstatement affect the acceptance of the risk?
6. Did the misstatement cause the insurer to suffer a loss of premium?
Beyond this, the decisions defy generalization. The inconsistencies be-
tween jurisdictions and even within given jurisdictions are great, and the law
in this area is in a seemingly endless state of flux.

